By Konrad Buczynski, Industryrisk.com.au
Planning for a truly ‘effective’ lockdown security regime can be a complex and challenging issue, especially within Australian workplaces, where building design has not historically been predicated upon security factors. Perhaps because of this, and despite the heightened threat of terrorism within the community, many organisations have done little in preparation for a serious incident, such as one involving an active shooter.
The reasons for this may vary widely; limitations caused by infrastructure, and a requirement for a high degree of public access are two key factors that can hamper planning. Gaining explicit management support to practice realistic drills may also be difficult, and adequate resourcing may not be available to address the most critical needs.
However, even those that have implemented good lockdown arrangements would invariably agree that there is no solution that approaches anywhere close to perfect. Even when infrastructure and funding prove favourable and forthcoming, the nuances of any given scenario would invariably expose vulnerabilities in established processes and systems. A disgruntled insider also has the potential to render any capability that is effective, largely redundant, as various recent events have shown.
Those that have seen an example of what might be regarded as a best-practice lockdown regime are in the minority. Indeed, many businesses are still in the early process of considering how to adjust their ‘AS 3745-2010 Planning for emergencies in facilities’ style plans to account for such a regime in a procedural sense. This is exacerbated by volunteer-staffed Emergency Control Organisations (ECOs), the potential for key person/coordinator absence, and an unwillingness for management to address the nature of the threat directly with staff…Click here to read full article.